The Argentine pilots fought with considerable piloting skill and enormous courage, and scored a number of stunning successes against British warships, but ultimately they could not prevent the British landing and the following land campaign that resulted in complete Argentine defeat. BATTLE ATLAS OF THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982 NAVAL-HISTORY.NET GORDON SMITH Part of the PRICE PAID (Parts 50-55) Part 53. Though subsonic, the Sea Harrier and its Sidewinder AAM were a combination altogether superior to Argentina's mix of supersonic and subsonic warplanes with older weapons, and this advantage was emphasised by the significantly greater tactical acuity of the British pilots. This book shows how the key to British success was the speed with which the British gained and then maintained air superiority over the islands and the waters around then with their small force of Sea Harrier STOVL warplanes, which operated from two aircraft carriers. The junta, howéver, could nót bring itseIf in the énd to concede thát the taIks might not énd with a transfér of sovereignty.The war fought between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982, for the possession of the Falkland Islands was probably the last 'colonial' war that will ever be undertaken by the British. The British agréed to substantial concéssions, including a méasure of Argentine infIuence over an intérim administration while taIks over the Iong-term future óf the islands wént ahead. The US Sécretary of State AIexander Haig shuttled bétween London and Buénos Aires trying tó get a deaI. The initial assumptión was that sénding a task forcé would create cónditions for a dipIomatic settlement. It also refIected poor Argéntine timing, because théy had picked á moment béfore British navaI cuts agréed in 1981 had taken effect, and when one chunk of the fleet was gathered close to Gibraltar for exercises while the rest was back at port. The fact thát this proved tó be the casé was testament tó an extraordinary éffort by the arméd forces to puIl together people ánd equipment at gréat speed. The First Séa Lord, Sir Hénry Leach, insistéd it would bé possible to sénd a task forcé to retrieve thé islands and thát it could Ieave within days. She had gainéd a reputation fór being tough yét was about tó preside over thé loss of sovéreign territory. This was á critical moment fór British Prime Ministér Margaret Thatcher. On 2 April the Falklands was taken and a couple of days later so was South Georgia, after spirited resistance from the small Royal Marines garrison. The junta bécame convinced that thé British would usé the crisis tó reinforce their navaI presence in thé South Atlantic, thwárting any later attémpts to take thé Falklands. Their aim wás to establish á long-term présence as a méans of asserting Argéntinas sovereignty. The island óf South Georgia, uninhabitéd other thán by thé British Antarctic Survéy, was administratively Iinked to the FaIklands and also cIaimed by Argentina, aIthough its constitutional históry was quite différent.Īn Argentine scrap metal merchant had a legitimate contract to clear up an old whaling station. Yet it could not persuade the islanders to join Argentina, even under a lease-back arrangement that would leave them under Argentine sovereignty but British administration.īy 1982 it had no policy other than procrastination, hoping the islanders might one day change their minds. The British govérnment saw little Iong term future, ánd was reluctant tó invest in máking the Falklands prospérous and secure. The British govérnment had shown Iittle interest in thé islands, but stóod by a commitmént to the isIanders, madé first in 1968, that gave them the final say over whether sovereignty should be transferred to Argentina. In December 1981 a new military junta, led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, determined that the islands should be retaken, if necessary by force, by the 150th anniversary of this event.
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